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Principal aims of the studies: 
 Study I: to test whether spontaneous propensity to lie can be changed by the 
disruptive (inhibiting) brain stimulation by repetitive transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (rTMS) targeted at the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). 
 Study II: to test whether changing the rTMS protocol from the disruptive 
(inhibiting) to facilitatory (exciting) type will lead to opposite results. 
 Study III: to re-test previous studies and to examine the role of the disruptive 
and facilitatory rTMS as applied to the DLPFC in behavioural conditions 
where participants were motivated to lie. 
 Study IV: to investigate how more or less significant crime-related items in 
the concealed information test are associated with the amplitude of the 
event-related potential (ERP) P300 component and how rTMS targeted at 
DLPFC affects P300 amplitude depending on item significance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Lying and deceiving, as well as efforts to establish the truth or to detect a lie, 
are as old as Mankind and have a long and versatile history, both in 
jurisprudence and popular lore. Recent scientific research has focused on both 
the evolutionary aspects of lying and the search for observable signs – 
identifiable verbal and non-verbal cues to deception and lying. Several methods 
have been proposed to detect lying: observation of people’s non-verbal 
behaviour; analysis of verbal content, structure and style of what somebody 
says; measurement of physiological responses. Still no perfect lie detection tests 
exist and lie detection experts are wrong on a regular basis.  
Many behavioural scientists have studied the phenomena involved in lying 
and concealment, and their identification. For example, Vrij (2000) took an 
interest in the search for specific signs that would indicate, on a verbal and non-
verbal level, the presence of deception. Ekman (2001) studied in his work 
expressive signals of insincerity, focusing his attention on the evolutionary 
aspects of this behaviour. According to Ekman (2001), lying can be defined as a 
deliberate attempt to mislead, without the implicit or explicit prior consent or 
notification of the target (the other person). In Vrij (2000) a definition of 
deception is as follows: “a successful or unsuccessful deliberate attempt, 
without forewarning, to create in another a belief which the communicator 
considers to be untrue”. Therefore, according to Vrij (2000): (1) lying is an 
intentional act; (2) people are lying only when they do not inform others in 
advance about their intentions to lie; (3) the lie has been defined solely from the 
perspective of the deceiver; (4) people sometimes fool themselves, a process 
which is called self-deception – the current definition excludes such self-
deception.  
Historically, the technology based experimental works on deception have 
typically concentrated on: (i) the “lie detector” (instrumental diagnostics of 
emotional stress, polygraph testing); (ii) the reaction time based method; (iii) 
the event-related potential (ERP) method. As the most up-to-date methods the 
recording of bioelectrical potential fluctuations of the brain by 
electroencephalography (EEG), registration of the brain local metabolism by 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), or recording and measuring 
electromagnetic signatures of brain processes by magnetoencephalography 
(MEG) have also been used. Contemporary methods in the procedures of 
identifying lying are based on registering the activation level of the brain 
regions that are hypothetically associated with deceptive information 
processing. 
Nowadays, the area of deception research is developing rapidly. According 
to Ganis and Keenan (2009) the respective future directions need to concentrate 
on: (i) identifying specificity or generality of deception processes; (ii) 
integration of different methods and measures; (iii) determining key variables of 
deception such as the dependence on the context; (iv) testing more real-life like 
8 
situations. This doctoral dissertation was designed to contribute to further 
development of this area. Importantly, the approach taken in this thesis purports 
to capitalise on moving from the prevailing correlational approach, which 
typically examines correlations between brain activity patterns and deceptive 
behaviour, to the less developed causal approach, whereby the effects of 
targeted manipulations of the brain processes on deception are studied. For this 
purpose the method of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is employed. 
The main focus was on the putative involvement of the brain mechanisms of 
cognitive-behavioural control in lying and the combined use of different 
methodologies such as behavioural experimental protocols, TMS, and 
EEG/ERP. The work behind this dissertation can be subsumed under basic 
research, however it has clear implications for the possible applications and 
their constraints thereof, in a legal and forensic context. In what follows we 
present the methodological and theoretical background of the current approach 
and describe the original research results – the most essential part of this work – 
where it fits in this context. Thereafter, the published work is collected so the 
reader can have a more detailed view of the topic and the specifics of the 
conducted studies. 
One aim of the present work is to study the susceptibility of lying behaviour 
and bioelectrical brain-process signatures indicative of deceptive commu-
nication to targeted perturbation of brain regions implicated in deception, 
specifically the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). The other, related aim 
is to explore the dependence of the expression of the above-mentioned 
bioelectrical signatures on the type of concealed information test and level of 
participants’ motivation to lie. We planned to: (1) test whether there are reliably 
verifiable effects of perturbation of DLPFC by TMS on the behavioural 
expression of deception; (2) examine the effects of exhausting vs. exciting the 
brain by TMS on deception; (3) measure the EEG/ERP signal fluctuations as a 
dependent variable indicative of the criticality of stimuli in the deceptive 
behaviour contexts. More specifically, the responses of the perturbed brain were 
measured in the circumstances where the participant’s cognitive processes were 
expected to distinguish automatically between the critical and neutral stimuli 
(a version of the “guilty knowledge test”). We set the following statements as 
the hypotheses: (1) there are cortex areas for which it is true that when their 
functionality is manipulated by TMS, a change in deceptive behaviour occurs; 
(2) this kind of TMS manipulation leads to a change in the degree of expression 
of the EEG signatures of deceptive communication and (3) the bioelectrical 
fluctuations of the EEG/ERP P300 potential in responses to critical stimuli 
differ from the responses to noncritical stimuli, with the extent of this effect 
depending on the particular experimental protocol and level of motivation of the 
participants.  
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1. Non-invasive brain stimulation and  
its effects on deception 
1.1. Deception-related brain regions:  
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
The biggest problem in determining whether lying has its corresponding brain 
region or specific brain mechanism is the fact that these regions may be and 
often are active without deception as well (Sip, Roepstorff, McGregor, & Frith, 
2008), this is because deception is based on several different cognitive 
processes that are linked to the same region (Sip et al., 2010). In several studies 
the DLPFC has been found to be involved in deceptive behaviour (e.g., 
Langleben et al., 2002; Priori et al., 2008; Christ, Van Essen, Watson, Brubaker, 
& McDermott, 2009; Mameli et al., 2010; Karim et al., 2010; Abe, 2011; Ito et 
al., 2012). More precisely, Kozel and colleagues (2009) found that a fMRI 
blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) signal could detect past event-related 
deception with 100% sensitivity, but with only 33% specificity. In their study, 
the mock-crime participants group showed a lateral and prefrontal pattern of 
activation, while the no-crime group showed activation of the medial prefrontal 
area. In an earlier work (2005) Kozel and colleagues observed increased 
activation of the anterior cingulate cortex, the motor areas of the frontal lobe, 
the insular cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, right medial frontal cortex, right superior 
area of the temporal lobe and in the left medial parietal lobe; this was found in a 
situation where the participants were denying a theft they actually committed. 
Other fMRI studies (Langleben et al., 2002; Spence et al., 2004) have shown 
that lying is associated with increased activity in the frontal cingulate cortex and 
parietal lobe. Lying, as well as the processes that accompany truthfulness are 
mediated by similar frontoparietal networks (Langleben et al., 2002). However, 
in the case of lying increased working memory-intensive activity is observed, 
characterised by increased activity in the inferolateral cortex, an area implicated 
in response selection, inhibition and response generation. In that study lying 
was discriminated from truth on a single-event level with an accuracy of 78%. 
In other studies lying was associated with activation of the frontal lobe's lower 
lateral region, while making up new versions of a lie required activation of the 
posterior lateral frontal lobe (Spence et al., 2004). Well-rehearsed lies that fit into 
a coherent story elicit more activation in the right anterior frontal cortices than do 
spontaneous lies that do not fit into a story (Ganis, Kosslyn, Stose, Thompson, & 
Yurgelun-Todd, 2003). The opposite pattern (decreased activation) occurs in the 
anterior cingulate and posterior visual cortex. According to this same study both 
types of lies were accompanied by excitation of the anterior prefrontal cortices 
(bilaterally), the parahippocampal gyrus (bilaterally), the right precuneus, and the 
left cerebellum when compared to the pattern of activity observed in the condition 
of behavioural truthfulness (Ganis et al., 2003).  
True memory, false memory and outright deception were studied by Abe and 
colleagues (2008): intentional manipulation of response in deception was 
3 
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characterised by increased prefrontal activity. They reasoned that the intentional 
cognitive process necessary for response manipulation required activation of the 
left middle frontal gyrus, also known as DLPFC. In their opinion, this structure 
can be seen as a reliable indicator of pretending to know and thus prefrontal 
activity seems to separate not only deception from truthfulness, but also 
deception from false memory. The experimental design used by Abe and 
colleagues (2008) allowed a differentiation between true recall and false recall 
of auditory presented words, with each eliciting a different brain activation 
pattern where the former was associated with activation of the lateral temporal 
and parietal cortices in a process of sensory reactivation. Their most important 
finding was confirmation of the central role the left prefrontal cortex played in 
the pretending-to-know cognitive task, whereas the right hippocampal area was 
involved in false recognition without a concomitant activation of sensory 
(auditory) areas (Abe et al., 2008). 
Lying is a type of mental activity presuming high demands on cognitive 
control. Consequently, brain structures involved in cognitive control must be a 
natural target for brain imaging analyses and intervention methods in research 
on deception. Even though the studies of the brain mechanisms of cognitive 
control often do not directly investigate deception as such, their results are also 
important to consider in deception research. For example, it has been noted that 
right and left DLPFC can be characterised as bearing different functionality: 
right DLPFC is involved in cognitive control, avoidance and behavioural 
inhibition (Knoch & Fehr, 2007; Shackman, McMenamin, Maxwell, Greischar, 
& Davidson, 2009; Vartaniana, Kwantesa, & Mandela, 2012); while left 
DLPFC participates in reality monitoring, approach motivation, strategic 
behaviour, naming and execution (Berkman & Lieberman, 2010; Abe, 2011; 
Steinbeis, Bernhardt, & Singer, 2012; Ito et al., 2012). As the prefrontal cortex 
is asymmetrical in its function, it is possible to assume that purposeful 
experimental manipulation (e.g., carried out by the rTMS) applied to the left 
and right DLPFC also brings about varying changes in behaviour with cognitive 
and executive control involved (Knoch et al., 2006). Therefore, the data from 
this mentioned research is relevant for our purposes, as we will see later on. 
Neuroimaging studies in which specific cortical areas are shown to become 
activated during lying cannot be taken literally or interpreted simplistically to 
indicate a cortical “locus” for lying. As pointed out by Luber and colleagues 
(2009) and Karim and colleagues (2010) such studies only provide evidence of 
a correlation between the activation of certain brain regions and the occurrence 
of a specific behaviour. However, the same cortical areas – together or 
separately – are involved in a variety of cognitive tasks when no deception is 
taking place. For example, the prefrontal, parietal, and anterior cingulate 
regions commonly activated in deception studies are also generally activated 
when executive processing is studied with no deception involved. Therefore, the 
activation of a cortical area during lying does not prove a directly causal 
relationship between it and the occurrence of lying (Luber et al., 2009). For this 
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reason we chose to investigate the causal effects of manipulation of DLPFC on 
deception related behaviour, which was carried out in Study I, II, III, and IV 
(Experiment 1). DLPFC as the locus of interest was selected primarily for three 
reasons: first, it is implied in many earlier studies as the cortical area somehow 
involved in deception; second, the precise role of DLPFC is not clear and 
controversial results have been obtained so far; third, this area can be relatively 
comfortably accessed by TMS. 
Studies of brain area activation through neuroimaging techniques (see Christ 
et al., 2009) can be said to fall broadly into two categories: studies that attempt 
to elicit evidence of deception through the presence of a specific pattern of 
cortical activation and studies that aim at the unraveling of the neurocognitive 
processes underlying deception. In the former, the aim is to correlate the 
activation of a set of brain regions with the occurrence of lying behaviour or 
instances of truthfulness. In this type of research, no attempt is made to infer 
what types of psychological processes are involved in lying and in correlating 
the activation of specific brain areas with such processes. This approach is 
relatively closer to some of the (possible) practical applications in the detection 
of deception. The other type of study views lying as a complex, high-level 
cognitive task and attempts to create a model for the underlying neurocognitive 
processes, using different experimental setups. This approach is more 
theoretical in its nature and is more strongly related to basic cognitive, affective, 
and social neuroscience. 
1.2. Methods of non-invasive brain stimulation:  
tDCS and TMS 
Non-invasive brain stimulation in the form of TMS or transcranial direct current 
stimulation (tDCS) have been used to test the validity of brain imaging findings 
(Luber et al., 2009) or in order to establish a causal relevance between the state 
of a cortical region and deceptive behaviour through the transient inhibition of 
cortical excitability (Karim et al., 2010). TMS can alter brain activity in a 
specific cortical region through the use of targeted magnetic fields temporarily 
disrupting or otherwise perturbing neural processing in the focal area (Luber et 
al., 2009). TMS is brought about by a brief and strong electrical current sent 
through a coil, which in turn produces a magnetic field that can be directed to the 
brain tissue (Hallett, 2007; Wagner, Valero-Cabre, & Pascua-Leone, 2007). The 
directed magnetic field has an effect on the neural processes, with the strongest 
effect taking place in the brain areas close to the source of the field. Thus TMS 
can be used to study the functioning of a certain area of the brain in relation to an 
existing behaviour through the disruption of neural processing in that area and the 
measurement of small but significant alterations in behaviour (Ilmoniemi & 
Karhu, 2008; Ridding & Rothwell, 2007). In this manner TMS and tDCS 
attempt to overcome “brain states versus behaviour” correlational issues and to 
demonstrate a causal relationship between the activation/inhibition of a specific 
brain region and changes in the performance of a complex cognitive task.  
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Neural processes can be either facilitated or inhibited depending on the 
intensity or timing of the TMS pulses. TMS uses the principle of electro-
magnetic induction, in order to induce a temporary and rather narrowly 
localised bioelectrical noise in the brain and to temporarily switch off or inhibit 
or even facilitate the functions in a particular region. In case of rTMS it could 
alter the excitability of the cortex, either increasing or decreasing it, depending 
on the parameters of stimulation (Hallett, 2007; Wagner et al., 2007). Inhibition 
typically emerges with stimulation at about 1 Hz frequency and excitation with 
stimulation at about 5 Hz frequency and higher (Hallett, 2007; Luber et al., 
2009). As for the tDCS, it can either excite cortical areas or decrease their 
activation capitalising on the passage of a DC current between anodal and 
cathodal scalp electrodes (Luber et al., 2009). (Obviously, the parameters of 
current are harmless for the participant’s health.) Anodal tDCS seems to 
increase excitability in the areas of interest, whereas cathodal stimulation 
appears to have an inhibitory effect (Luber et al., 2009).  
 
1.3. The effects of dorsolateral prefrontal  
cortex stimulation on deception 
Repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) of the DLPFC causes a 
transient disruption of functioning in this area. Stimulating DLPFC by rTMS 
optimised for the disruptive effect has been reported to result in altered 
decision-making strategies compared with sham stimulation. Knoch and 
colleagues (2006) inhibited the right DLPFC with low frequency rTMS and 
observed significant increases in risky decision making in their participants, 
compared to participants in which inhibitory stimulation was received on the 
left DLPFC or sham stimulation was applied to either side. Similarly, Fecteau 
and colleagues (2007) used tDCS to impact anodal stimulation to the right 
DLPFC while applying a cathodal tDCS to the left DLPFC and found that their 
participants more often made the safer choice, while taking less time to evaluate 
and choose between low risk and high risk possibilities, compared with sham 
stimulation. Inversion of the experimental parameters with anodal tDCS 
stimulation of the left DLPFC and cathodal inhibition of the right DLPFC did 
not induce a difference in riskiness of choices but did result in a longer time 
interval in making a choice. Experimental manipulation of the human ability to 
produce deceptive responses through interference with the neural processes at 
specific sites (DLPFC, bilaterally) was described by Priori and colleagues in a 
2008 study involving the stimulation of the right and left DLPFC through 
anodal and cathodal direct currents applied separately to these areas. Their 
results showed no influence on the frequency of deceptive responses, but a 
demonstrable increase in the time delay (RT) involved in making deceitful 
responses. Mameli and colleagues (2010) found that the neural networks 
underlying personal knowledge related deception vs. deception regarding 
general knowledge are separate and distinct. They showed this by an 
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experimental design involving anodal tDCS stimulation of DLPFC bilaterally 
and demonstrated a speeding up of reaction times in the production of general 
knowledge related deceptive responses. Karim and colleagues (2010) found that 
inhibition of the anterior prefrontal cortex (aPFC) by cathodal tDCS led to 
significant within-participant increase of deceptive behaviour. 
When we started with rTMS experiments there were – up to our knowledge – 
no TMS studies which would have tried to modulate deception performance and 
no research to date has addressed the issue of whether the technique has any 
potential for reliably disrupting deception in a single participant (Ganis, 2014). 
There were two studies that used single pulse TMS to probe motor cortex 
excitability during deception (Duzel et al., 2003; Kelly et al., 2009). So in our 
first experiments (Study I and II) the more specific exploratory aims of those 
studies were to ascertain whether the propensity to lie can be artificially 
changed and if yes, what specific brain locations are involved in this effect. In 
Study I, we tested whether spontaneous propensity to lying can be changed by 
brain stimulation and found that stimulating the DLPFC with rTMS affects the 
rate of spontaneous lying in simple behavioural tasks. Where participants (16 
subjects divided into two stimulation groups) had freedom to name presented 
stimulus-objects (red and blue coloured circles) either veridically or 
nonveridically the amount of truthful answers can be manipulated by inhibitory 
6.31 minute long off-line 1-Hz repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation 
targeted at DLPFC: inhibition of the left DLPFC with rTMS increased the 
relative rate of lying, but inhibition of the right DLPFC decreased it. The main 
shortcoming of Study I consisted in the lack of the sham condition. Because 
experimental TMS related manipulation for obtaining a true sham condition 
indiscriminable from real TMS does not exist (especially when DLPFC as a 
region close to face is stimulated), we used a control area (parietal cortex) 
which is not known to be directly associated with lying. However, in order to 
check for the different type of possible shortcomings stemming from the absence 
of sham condition such as differences in the general non-localised effects of TMS 
we used in our next studies the sham condition for finding the baseline lying rate 
to be compared with this rate in main experimental conditions. 
With Study II, we wanted to test whether changing the rTMS protocol from 
the disrupting to facilitatory type can lead to results showing opposite effects. In 
Study II the participants (20 subjects divided into two stimulation groups) were 
allowed to report the name of the shape (circle or square) of the object they 
actually saw or report the name of the object they did not actually see, therefore 
producing a non-truthful response. When trains of 10-Hz pulses (16 trains of 
10-Hz rTMS pulses; each train lasted 1 s, followed by 10 s stimulation free 
period between trains) were delivered to the right DLPFC, the propensity to lie 
increased while similar left-hemisphere DLPFC stimulation did not change the 
rate of untruthful responses. Hence, compared to the results of Study I, the 
opposite effect was revealed in Study II: propensity to produce non-truthful 
naming responses increased when we stimulated the right DLPFC. At the same 
4 
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time left DLPFC stimulation did not lead to the expected decrease in non-
truthful responding. This result supports the possibility that the earlier results 
were not caused by contralateral hemispherically localized effects of TMS, but 
were hemisphere dependent in other ways. The opposite effect compared to the 
one found with right DLPFC stimulation in Study II and the lack of the 
expected opposite effect with left DLPFC stimulation as taken together and as 
supported by an experimental design where sham control was used suggest that 
levels of bias to lie were manipulated primarily by right DLPFC stimulation. 
Either the former left DLPFC effect can be obtained only with the disrupting 
type of rTMS and not with the facilitatory type or it was obtained as a result of 
contralateral homotopic TMS-induced excitation of the right DLPFC by left 
DLPFC stimulation. 
In order to retest those earlier findings and develop this subject further, we 
conducted Study III in which we examined all four conditions (the excitation 
and inhibition of the left and right DLPFC with rTMS) together in the same 
participants and used a larger sample (16 subjects for each condition). However, 
in order to develop a method and test for the generality of the effects, we 
replaced the task requiring simple, spontaneous object-naming responses with 
lying in a more highly motivated and engaging task context. Notwithstanding 
this, we preserved the participants’ free will in regard to whether, how much 
and when to lie. We found that the excitation of the left DLPFC decreased lying 
compared to excitation of the right DLPFC, but contrary to the expectation, 
inhibition had no different effects. The reason that no difference of the effect 
was found between left- and right-hemisphere stimulation in the rTMS 
inhibitory condition may be predominantly methodological: that is to say 1-Hz 
rTMS has a lingering effect which reduces the comparative laterality effects 
between DLPFCs especially when cognitive control is involved (Torii, 2012; 
Hansenne, 2004). The duration of the rTMS effect is mainly dependent on the 
duration and the strength of the magnetic stimulation. Thus, the one reason why 
in our first experiment (Study I) the behavioural differences occurred may be 
related to the length of the behavioural task: in our first experiment the task 
performance lasted several times less (2-3 min) than in this experiment (5-8 
min) whereas the duration of stimulation was even half a minute shorter (6 min 
vs. 6.31 min). Therefore, in the present case (Study III) the rTMS application 
was not sufficient to induce a statistically significant change in behaviour. 
Taking the results of Studies I, II, and III all together it is possible to 
formulate that the propensity to lie can be manipulated by non-invasive brain 
stimulation by TMS targeted at DLPFC. The effects depend on (i) stimulated 
hemisphere, (ii) type of stimulation, and (iii) possibly on task demands. It seems 
that the excitation protocol is more systematic compared with the inhibition 
protocol. It also appears that whether right-hemisphere effects or left-
hemisphere effects are more or less robust depends on the type of task and the 
duration of stimulation as well as on the aftereffects – all this being evidenced 
by the differences between the results of different studies. 
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2. EEG signatures of deception and  
what does combining the TMS with EEG show 
2.1. Electroencephalogram and concealed information test 
The traditional psychophysiological lie detection measures used to be obtained 
with polygraph. These measures typically include respiration, galvanic skin 
reaction (GSR) or electrodermal response (EDR), cardiovascular measures such 
as pulse and blood pressure (e.g., Lykken, 1959; Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2003; 
Carmel, Dayan, Naveh, Raveh, & Ben-Shakhar, 2003). Today’s studies are 
based also more on electroencephalographic psychophysiology and brain 
imaging other than EEG. A widespread behavioural task, which is used together 
with these methods is the Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT), recently known also 
as the Concealed Information Test (CIT; Lykken, 1959, 1979; Rosenfeld, 
2011). CIT is a modern method of polygraph interrogation that advances 
psychophysiological detection of prior knowledge of crime details that would 
be known only by the perpetrator (Verschuere, Ben-Shakhar, & Meijer, 2011). 
It is developed to detect whether or not a person (e.g. suspect) recognises the 
importance of information, which could be known only by the guilty 
perpetrator. In the CIT psychophysiological responses to critical (i.e., 
potentially accusation allowing or incriminating) items are compared to the 
responses to neutral (i.e., contextually not significant) items with participants 
trying to hide or deny that they have specific contextualised knowledge of the 
critical items. If critical items lead to enhanced responses compared to the 
responses to neutral items, concealed information knowledge is said to be 
detected.  
When combined with EEG recording, CIT has produced quite reliable ERP 
signatures of deception such as P300 (Farwell & Donchin, 1986; Ambach, 
Bursch, Stark, & Vaitl, 2010; Rosenfeld & Labkovsky, 2010; Verschuere, Ben-
Shakhar, & Meijer, 2011; Farwell, 2012). CIT studies have used both the two- 
and three-item protocols; a three item protocol includes an additional stimulus – 
a target (Farwell & Donchin, 1991; Rosenfeld, Soskins, Bosh, & Ryan, 2004; 
Mertens & Allen, 2008; Rosenfeld, Hu, & Pederson, 2012). The target is basically 
an irrelevant item in what concerns concealment behaviour, but the participant 
is assigned to make a unique button response which would be different from the 
responses to irrelevant and critical (“probe”) items. The target is meant to be 
used to keep the participant’s attention on randomly presented unpredictable 
items. However, there is no clear consistency in the ERPs associated with 
targets as the responses to targets may be sometimes significantly less accurate 
than responses to true irrelevants (Seymour, Seifert, Shafto, & Mosmann, 2000; 
Gamer & Berti, 2010). In some studies, the probes and targets have produced 
similar ERPs (Farwell & Smith, 2001) but in some cases targets have produced 
larger P300 amplitudes than probes (Mertens & Allen, 2008). 
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The significance of a crime-related knowledge is one source we have to 
consider in creating more real-life like experiments. Ambach, Dummel, Lüer, & 
Vaitl (2011) compared two different questioning formats (“did you see?” vs. 
“did you steal?”) with two different encodings of items of interest (only seen vs. 
seen and stolen items). Thus, the level of significance was different for these 
two types of items and, depending on the item type, only one question required 
deception. They found that both types, irrespective of the question, elicited 
different physiological responses compared to entirely new items. However, 
only for the stealing question, responses to actually stolen objects were also 
different from merely seen objects. It is important to elaborate on the work of 
Ambach and colleagues (2011) to further understand how levels of information 
significance influence the sensitivity of deception detection with a CIT. The 
combination of CIT with EEG should be particularly well suited for pursuing 
this task due to the superior temporal resolution of the evoked neural processes 
in response to a crime related item (and its significance). Thus, for Study IV, 
we decided not to include targets in our CIT protocol and modeled our approach 
more closely on the classical CIT protocol. In Study IV, two experiments 
(Experiment 1 and Experiment 2) were carried out to examine the effect of 
stimulus significance on ERP-based detection of deception. Differently from 
previous studies which used a CIT protocol with the mock crime scenario, we 
distinguish between three types of stimuli: the critical stimulus (stolen by the 
participant), familiar stimuli (present during the enactment of the crime) and 
neutral stimuli (no prior exposure). Also, it was examined how rTMS to DLPFC 
affects P300 as a function of stimulus significance. The respective results will 
be summarised in part 2.3. 
 
2.2. Electroencephalographic signatures of deception 
Electroencephalogram and event-related potentials based methods are designed 
for registering the changes in the bioelectrical potentials of the brain. EEG 
measures electrical activity of the brain with sensors (electrodes) picking up 
bioelectrical signals of the brain communicated through the skull and scalp. 
ERP consists in a series of time-related changes in bioelectrical potentials 
resulting from the activity of billions of nerve cells involved in sensory, 
cognitive and motor processes as specific neural events in response to external 
and internal perturbations. To obtain ERP numerous event-related epochs of 
EEG are taken, being timed to the same specific event and the potential of the 
epochs is averaged. By the means of measuring the level of synchronisation of 
the power changes and/or the phases of the oscillatory processes recorded in 
EEG, information on the neural correlates of different cognitive processes can 
be obtained (Luck, 2005; Sauseng & Klimesch, 2008). Although spatially 
inaccurate, EEG has some advantages compared, for example, to fMRI and PET 
(positron emission tomography) as the latter are methods with low temporal 
resolution. While cognitive processes are dynamic, EEG/ERP enable to describe 
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the course of the phenomenon in the range of short intervals (millisecond-range) 
in real time (Ward, 2003; Sauseng & Klimesch, 2008); this enables one to 
analyse the oscillating activity of the brain. Each oscillation can be described 
through its frequency value, amplitude, and the phase. The oscillatory brain 
activity can be divided into the following typically used frequency bands: Delta 
(0–4 Hz), Theta (3.5–7 Hz), Alpha (8–13 Hz), Beta (18–30 Hz) and Gamma 
(30–100 Hz). The EEG phase synchrony can be characterised by several 
important features such as its cross-cortical manifestation, cross-frequency 
coupling and relatedness to external events (Sauseng & Klimesch, 2008). 
The ERP waves consist of positive and negative deviations, the typical peaks 
of which in response to a visual stimulus are marked P1, P2, P3 and N1, N2 N3. 
The P3 wave that is strongly dependent on the performed task is sensitive to 
cognitive demands during task processing, working memory operations, 
response preparation, and evaluation of the significance of the perceived 
stimulus (Luck, 2005; Polich, 2007). The EEG-assisted recording of the P300 
(P3) amplitude and topography of the critical ERP components have been used 
for various purposes in fundamental and applied research. When the stimulus-
evoked activity is significant and highly meaningful for the person, 
enhancement of this positive potential component is registered, beginning 
approximately 300–400 milliseconds after the stimulus (Mertens & Allen, 
2008). If a stimulus signifying or depicting an object related to a crime or 
personally significant to a participant is presented, P300 in response to this 
stimulus is enhanced (Ambach et al., 2010; Farwell, 2012). Typically, persons 
involved in actions allowing incrimination or having knowledge that would 
allow relate this person to some suspicious connection, try to conceal 
knowledge of the critical stimuli. However, based on P300 the range of 
correctly identified deceptions in different studies has been 89–95% (Rosenfeld, 
Angell, Johnson, & Qian, 1991; Farwell & Donchin, 1991; Allen et al., 1992). 
At the same time, more modest results have been also obtained: e.g., Gamer and 
Berti (2010) did not find an increase in P300 for critical items. In the study by 
Mertens and Allen (2008) the range of correctly identified “guilty” respondents 
was 27–47%, depending on the form of the analysis; this range decreased even 
more when respondents were instructed on how to use the countermeasures. 
However, the respondents who were “not guilty” were correctly identified in 
almost all cases. (It should be noted here that from the applied legal point of 
view, it should be useful not only to reliably detect lies, but also to provide 
evidence pointing towards innocence of the participant so as to avoid mistaken 
accusations or even convictions.) 
 
2.3. Deception detection research: design components 
The ultimate purpose of research in detecting deception is to develop valid and 
reliable objective signatures of deception in the applied context. This purpose 
necessitates making the experiments more similar to real life situations, which 
5
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leads to using the mock-crime type experimental protocols. Ben-Shakhar and 
Elaad (2003) also concluded in their meta-analytic work that various card-test 
procedures have relatively low validity, while mock-crime procedures have the 
highest level of validity (compared to the card-test and personal-item 
paradigms). They also suggested that motivation is likely to be much higher 
under realistic simulated conditions. One possibility to make the experiment 
more similar to real life is to use objects as means of experiment, supported by 
cues indicative of these objects. Cutmore and colleagues (2009) have compared 
faces, pictures of objects and words in ERP based deception detection, partly 
because of practical reasons (as photographs are usually used in crime 
investigations) and partly because they are more effective in eliciting the 
oddball P300. Their results confirmed that a picture of a stolen object was a 
more efficient cue than the word of the stolen object. Therefore, to make the test 
more realistic, it would be useful for deception detection to photograph the 
objects in the context where the mock-crime took place. McBride and Dosher 
(2002) also showed that pictures are better recalled than words (free recall) and 
better recollected when cued with only a fragment. Ambach and colleagues 
(2010) demonstrated a more pronounced P300 to probe (critical) stimuli when 
pictures were used. Stronger ERP responses to pictorial rather than verbal 
stimuli in concealed information detection were also found by Cutmore and 
colleagues (2009). They compared the effects of faces, pictures of objects and 
words in ERP based deception detection, their results also confirmed that a 
picture of a stolen object was a more effective cue than the word specifying the 
stolen object. Ally and Budson (2007) found that compared to words, when 
familiarity is enhanced, pictures enhance recollection; therefore, less post-
retrieval processes are needed.  
In addition to the cognitive components of mental activity involved in 
deception, motivation of the participant also plays an important part. There are 
different ways to motivate a participant. Ben-Shakhar and Elaad (2003) reported 
that highly motivated deceptive guilty participants were more easily detected in 
the CIT than less motivated deceptive guilty participants. Motivation to defeat 
the test and thus avoid detection is also an important factor, as shown by 
Rosenfeld and colleagues (2012). These researchers showed that deception 
awareness makes it easier to detect the less rehearsed information. Furthermore, 
feedback about deception proves to be important in this respect: continuous 
feedback about deception received by the deception group but not in the control 
group helped maintain participants` awareness of their deception and therefore 
also attention to the probe-irrelevant dimension (Rosenfeld et al., 2012). The 
feedback would enhance P300 effects in the deception group, but not in the 
control group (where the attention was directed to target-nontarget dimension). 
Motivation and attention can also be better engaged by asking the participant to 
respond by providing a verbal answer. This was found for example by Ben-
Shakhar and Elaad (2003), who suggested that although producing deceptive 
responses verbally may not be absolutely necessary for producing differential 
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responsiveness to the relevant items, they may contribute to the enhancement of 
the signatures of deception. It is also important to bear in mind here that the 
amplitude of the P300 is also affected by the number of items. Hu and 
colleagues (2012) showed that increasing the number of irrelevant items would 
increase the task demands of executing countermeasures. In that case, the 
participants would need to hold more irrelevant stimuli in their working 
memory, which is cognitively more demanding for participants aspiring to use 
countermeasures; additionally adding more irrelevant items will also increase 
probe P300. 
In conclusion, it is possible to summarise that the amplitude of P300 may 
depend on stimulus type (word or picture) (Cutmore et al., 2009; Ambach et al., 
2010) or familiarity with the object (accessibility to recall) (Ally & Budson, 
2007), participants’ attention and motivation to lie and awareness of their 
deception (Rosenfeld et al., 2012) as well as on memory load (Hu et al., 2012) 
etc. Also, it may depend on the type of response (pressing the button or verbal) 
(Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2003). Even though it is a well-known fact that P300 
amplitude is enhanced along with the more meaningful the stimuli are, and the 
less frequently they appear (see for example Rosenfeld et al., 2012), it is not the 
easiest thing to achieve in a precisely measurable way. One possibility to 
overcome this problem is to add more irrelevant stimuli, which will increase the 
probe P300 amplitude by making the task cognitively more demanding and 
more complicated if one wants to use countermeasures (Hu et al., 2012). It does 
mean, however, that more stimuli, more time for measurements. As indicated by 
Huffmeijer and colleagues (2014), at least up to about 30 trials are needed in 
order to have more or less reliable ERP’s per stimuli type for analysis (for P300 
it is suggested to have even up to 60 trials). When we planned our EEG-CIT 
experiment (Study IV), we tried to take into account and control as much of the 
above-mentioned considerations as possible. By means of the two experiments, 
we vary the number of conditions. Besides the modification of the relevance of 
the stimuli the frequency effect and the word versus picture effect was tested, a 
more realistic crime scenario paradigm compared to the former more artificial 
paradigm was used, and the level of motivation to lie was enhanced. In 
Experiment I of Study IV we adopted a behavioural task where sheets of paper 
with words indicating goods to steal were presented to participants. They were 
instructed to imagine stealing one of these items from the store. Words were 
used as stimuli during the CIT as well. The goal of the Experiment II of Study 
IV was to further investigate the effect of stimulus significance on the P300 
response. We hypothesised that any potential differences between critical and 
familiar stimuli might depend on how life-like, including how engaging, the 
experiment is. We know from previous CIT studies that the P300 response is 
indeed stronger for more realistic stimuli (Cutmore et al., 2009; Ambach et al., 
2010). It is also positively influenced by the participants’ attention and 
motivation to lie and their awareness of the deception (Rosenfeld et al., 2012; 
Sip et al., 2013). Last but not least, the P300 response to the critical stimulus 
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depends on the number of irrelevant stimuli included in the experiment 
(Johnson & Rosenfeld, 1992; Hu et al., 2012). Thus, in Experiment 2 
participants had to steal real objects from a room nearby the laboratory. 
Furthermore, pictures of these objects were used as stimuli during the CIT. The 
second experiment also involved more familiar and neutral stimuli than the first 
experiment, and some of the participants were observed by an eyewitness 
during the crime episode (to increase deception awareness).  
Based on the aforementioned published findings we expected to observe 
differences between our first, more low-key and artificial, experiment and our 
second, more realistic and engaging, experiment. We hypothesised that the 
effect of the critical stimulus on the P300 response is more pronounced in 
Experiment 2 compared to the effect of familiar and neutral stimuli in 
Experiment 1. Consistent with the hypothesis, in Experiment 1 and 2 (Study 
IV) we found that the P300 component exhibited systematic amplitude 
differences in response to critical items compared to neutral items. Importantly, 
with the more realistic and deception awareness enhancing conditions of 
Experiment 2 as compared to Experiment 1 the effects were much more robust. 
P300 was more reliable as a marker of deception on the single participant level 
in Experiment 2 compared to Experiment 1. Deception could be detected 
reliably using P300 amplitude for only 22% of the participants in experiment 1. 
In Experiment 2, this was true for 71% of the participants. 
While ERP/P300 is the best known brain-potential signature of deception in 
the concealed information detection test, it would be important to know whether 
rTMS has any effect on the extent of expression of P300 and if yes, are there 
any hemispheric differences analogous to what was found in the behavioural 
spontaneous lying study where rTMS was used. This is important both for 
theoretical analysis of the brain mechanisms behind the participants’ behaviour 
in the CIT-like tasks and for practical purposes where purposeful manipulation 
with participants’ sensitivity to critical stimuli operationalised by deception-
related ERPs might be desirable. 
 
2.4. EEG signatures in combination with TMS effects 
If we look only at the response of the brain to the stimuli, we get the results that 
are merely correlational in nature. A different tradition of neurobiological 
research on deception combines brain imaging with non-invasive brain 
stimulation (Thut & Pascual-Leone, 2010; Miniussi & Thut, 2010; Shafi, 
Westover, Fox, & Pascual-Leone, 2012; Rogasch & Fitzgerald, 2013). This 
approach is capable of examining also causal effects and therefore increases the 
methodological rigour of the studies of brain mechanisms of deception as we 
did in our Studies I, II, III (Priori et al., 2008; Luber et al. 2009; Mameli et al., 
2010). Despite this potential, there were no studies of brain stimulation effects 
on deception-related P300 ERP responses when we began our survey (Study 
IV, Experiment 1). It is reasonable to assume that the location one would like to 
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choose for non-invasive brain stimulation in order to see the effect on 
ERP/P300 should be meaningful from the point of view of earlier results from 
the brain imaging studies of deception. At the same time, this type of brain 
locus should be accessible for manipulation by non-invasive stimulation 
methods. The TMS is a convenient method to influence cortical processes in the 
locus of interest. So, the combined use of EEG and TMS gives better 
possibilities to study the activity of neural networks and the brain functions and 
to understand the connections between the brain and behaviour as the 
stimulation of different brain regions evokes different patterns in EEG 
(Ilmoniemi & Karhu, 2008; Komssi & Kähkönen, 2006; Ridding & Rothwell, 
2007; Wagner et al., 2007; Hallett, 2007). In order to study the temporal-causal 
connections of the active areas with the functional MRI we also need the 
models of neural networks, where one of the possibilities to map the cortex is 
provided by the combination of TMS and EEG (Komssi & Kähkönen, 2006).  
To state the working hypothesis in Study IV, Experiment 1 we also needed 
to consider specific information related to DLPFC-targeted rTMS effects on 
deceptive behaviour. On the one hand, it appears that specifically right-
hemisphere rTMS targeted at DLPFC influences deceptive behaviour (the joint 
results of Study I and II) and thus is expected to have a significant effect on 
P300. On the other hand, clear disruptive rTMS effects on P300 have been 
found specifically with left-hemisphere rTMS of DLPFC (Torii et al., 2012). 
Thus, in order to have a clearer picture of the putative rTMS effects on P300, 
DLPFC of both hemispheres had to be stimulated. We hypothesised that right 
but not left DLPFC rTMS will have an effect on the P300 difference between 
the conditions of neutral and critical stimulus presentation whereas left DLPFC 
rTMS will change P300 parameters uniformly regardless of the stimulus type. 
Therefore, our Study IV, specifically Experiment 1 turned to be an 
exploratory study by nature, where P300 as an ERP signature known to be 
sensitive to critical stimuli in CIT is measured in the conditions where a CIT 
like task is combined with brain stimulation. As P300 has been found to be 
susceptible to rTMS effects in the context of cognitive control (Hansenne et al., 
2004; Torii et al., 2012), it was in our interest to test whether P300 is 
susceptible to rTMS effects in the CIT context as well. We examined whether 
the extent to which this expressed signature can be manipulated by non-invasive 
brain stimulation depends on CIT type experimental variables. Our aim was not 
to validate or cross-validate more or less standardised CIT tasks and methods 
against EEG and/or brain stimulation procedures, but just to explore whether an 
ERP signature having been implicated in deception detection research earlier is 
in principle subject to manipulation in the context similar to CIT where brain 
responses to critical and neutral stimuli are compared. Our results (Study IV, 
Experiment 1) showed that the P300 response to critical stimuli had higher 
amplitude if compared with the P300 response to neutral stimuli. However, this 
effect was suppressed if DLPFC was inhibited with rTMS prior to stimulus 
presentation. This result supported our assumptions that DLPFC is involved in 
6
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CIT type deceptive behaviour, and P300 is a sensitive signature of this. As TMS 
provided a means to exert a causal effect on the respective brain systems, the 
arguments in favour of DLPFC and P300 as the factors in CIT type deceptive 
behaviour were strengthened. If participants lie less about what they see as a 
result of suppression of the functionality of a cortical locus by rTMS (e.g., as 
happened with the right DLPFC suppression also in Study I), this means that 
this locus must be instrumental in establishing the cognitive control necessary to 
produce untruthful responses. When a participant sees a critical stimulus in a 
concealed information task, a highly meaningful representation of the stimulus 
is formed in the working memory and the participant has to exert strong control 
in order to avoid reporting or otherwise indicating that this stimulus is what 
he/she stole. Consequently, the amplitude of the P300 in response to the critical 
stimulus must be larger than the P300 amplitude in response to a neutral 
stimulus. If rTMS subdues this locus – e.g., the right hemisphere DLPFC –, 
P300 amplitude should also relatively decrease when the participant sees a 
critical stimulus. 
The unexpected result was that we did not find any difference between left- 
and right-hemisphere stimulation, which did not support our specific TMS-
related hypothesis. First, because contralateral homologous brain areas are 
strongly and reliably influenced by ipsilateral TMS, there may be a carryover 
effect, so that right and left hemisphere manipulations become equivalent in 
certain specific conditions. Second, because in our other studies (Studies I and 
II looked at in combination) especially the right DLPFC involvement in 
deception was indicated and a different task compared to the CIT type of task 
used here was employed, this difference may be a consequence of the different 
task demands and cognitive processes associated with these tasks. Further 
studies are needed to understand this discrepancy. 
Taken all together the deception studies of this thesis which were based on 
ERP registration allow to state the following: (i) P300 can be used as the 
informative and perhaps the main signature of deception, (ii) P300 as the 
marker of deception can be manipulated by TMS, (iii) realistic scenarios and 
specific depiction of critical items (photographs) gives better interpretability of 
the results, (iv) task performance should be sufficiently motivated in order to 
lead to noticeable effects, (v) a considerable inter-individual variability of the 
susceptibility to the ERP based CIT should be acknowledged.  
  
23 
CONCLUSIONS 
This doctoral thesis is founded on the effects of transcranial magnetic 
stimulation on deceptive communication and electroencephalography of the 
signatures of this kind of communication. More broadly speaking, the thesis 
investigates lying behaviour in its relation to the brain processes. We 
hypothesised that certain cortex areas exist, for which it is true that when their 
functionally is manipulated by TMS changes in deceptive behaviour follow and 
this will also lead to the change in the degree of expression of the EEG 
signatures of deception. To test the hypotheses, we studied the effects of 
exhausting and exciting the selected brain areas (left and right DLPFC) by TMS 
and tested whether there are corresponding effects on the behavioural 
expression of deception. We also measured the EEG/ERP signal fluctuations in 
response to the criticality of stimuli in the deceptive behaviour contexts. Our 
results showed that the frontal cortex plays a crucial role in deceptive 
behaviour, particularly as related to the propensity to lie, and that the brain-
process signatures of lying can in principle be manipulated by non-invasive 
brain stimulation targeted at the dorsolateral prefrontal areas. It is also apparent 
that sensitivity of the electrophysiological brain-process signatures of deception 
to critical stimuli considerably varies between subjects.  
Main results of the empirical part of the dissertation consisted of the 
following: 
1) The propensity to lie can be manipulated by non-invasive brain stimulation 
by TMS targeted at DLPFC. The effects depend on the stimulated 
hemisphere and type of stimulation. (Studies I, II, and III) 
2) The spontaneous choice to lie more or less in a naming task can be 
influenced by brain stimulation. 1-Hz offline rTMS can be used for changing 
participants’ situational disposition to lie more or to lie less; right 
hemisphere DLPFC stimulation in the specific conditions of our setup and 
design decreased lying while homologous left hemisphere stimulation 
increased lying. (Study I) 
3) The way how right DLPFC and other areas functionally associated with it 
are involved in producing truthful or deliberately deceptive statements about 
perceived objects considerably depends on what are the parameters of 
stimulation by which functionality of the system involving DLPFC is 
manipulated. When trains of 10-Hz pulses were delivered to the right 
DLPFC, propensity to lie increased while similar left-hemisphere DLPFC 
stimulation did not change the rate of untruthful responses. (Study II) 
4) In an informed and motivated lying situation the left DLPFC excitation 
protocol tends to decrease lying contrary to right DLPFC excitation, but the 
inhibition did not make any significant differences (Study III). Based on our 
studies it seems that the excitation protocol is more systematic compared 
with the inhibition protocol when manipulation of the propensity to lie is at 
stake in a more motivated and realistic lying context. It appears that whether 
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right-hemisphere or left-hemisphere excitatory or inhibitory effects are more 
or less robust depends on the type of task in conjunction with the duration of 
stimulation as evidenced by the differences between the results of different 
studies (Studies I, II, and III). 
5) Pre-CIT inhibitory rTMS could decrease the sensitivity of the participant’s 
brain to the test: rTMS to DLPFC attenuated P300 amplitude in response to 
the more significant items (Study IV, Experiment 1). 
6) P300 can be used as the main signature of deception (Study IV). P300 
exhibits systematic amplitude differences in response to the more as well as, 
the less significant items compared to neutral items (Study IV, Experiment 
1). More realistic scenarios and specific depiction of critical items 
(photographs) help emphasise the enhancement of the P300 component only 
in response to the more significant items (Study IV, Experiment 2). 
7) P300 may be quite an unreliable marker of deception on the single 
participant level – it depends on CIT experiment paradigm and participants’ 
individual differences: only 22% of the participants could be detected 
reliably using P300 amplitude in Experiment 1 and 71% of the participants 
in Experiment 2 (Study IV). 
 
Based on the results of the present thesis one can conclude that TMS can be 
used to manipulate the relative level of propensity to deceive and that P300 is a 
reliable marker of deception in a CIT type of test only in a sub-sample of 
participants. P300 as a marker of deception if observed in a suitable behavioural 
test can be manipulated by TMS. However, our present level of knowledge 
informed by the studies reported here cannot allow to state reliably whether the 
TMS effects in principle are limited only to a quite modest range of 
modification of deceptive behaviour – as was the case in our experimental 
data – and nothing more, or is there a potential for some more robust modi-
fication of the willingness and capability to lie.  
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Petukäitumine: transkraniaalse magnetstimulatsiooni  
efektid ja elektroentsefalograafia signatuurid 
Käesolev doktoriväitekiri keskendub ebaausa suhtlemise alusmehhanismide 
uurimisele. Eesmärgiks on välja selgitada, kas ja kuidas muutub isiku poolt 
antud tajuhinnangu tõelevastavus, kui mõjutada aju transkraniaalse magnet-
stimulatsiooniga (TMS) ning millised on aju tööd kajastavad bioelektrilised 
signatuurid valetamise ja petukäitumise puhul. Eeldati järgmist: (i) on olemas 
ajukoore piirkonnad, mille funktsioonide häirimine TMS abil muudab 
petukäitumist ning nende muutuste iseloom sõltub TMS rakendamise kohast 
ning stimulatsioonirežiimist (Uurimused I, II ja III); (ii) aju bioelektrilised 
vastused kriitilistele stiimulitele erinevad vastustest neutraalsetele stiimulitele 
(Uurimus IV, Eksperiment I ja II); (iii) aju TMS-ga mõjutamine muudab 
elektroentsefalograafia (EEG) abil registreeritud sündmuspotentsiaalide 
väljendumise määra (Uurimus IV, Eksperiment I). 
Kokkuvõtvalt on antud väitekirja peamised tulemused järgmised:  
1) Ajustimulatsiooni abil on võimalik manipuleerida inimeste valetamise 
määra. See, kas inimesed hakkavad TMS-i mõjul vähem või rohkem 
valetama, sõltub sellest, millist ajupoolkera ja millisel moel (mõjurežiimil) 
on mõjutatud. (Uurimused I, II ja III)  
2) Korduvimpulssidega transkraniaalse magnetstimulatsiooni (rTMS-i) nn 
väsitava ehk pärssiva režiimi mõju (1-Hz sagedusega offline režiimis 
mõjutamine) rakendamisega on võimalik esile kutsuda muutust inimeste 
petukäitumises. Olukorras, kus katseisikutel oli vabalt valida, millal ja kui 
palju nad tõeselt või mittetõeselt nimetavad nähtud objekte, kutsus parema 
poolkera dorsolateraalse prefrontaalse ajukoore funktsionaalse seisundi 
pärssimine esile valetamise suhtelise vähenemise, samas kui vasaku pool-
kera vastava piirkonna mõjutamine suurendas valetamist. (Uurimus I)  
3) rTMS-i ergastava mõju (10-Hz sagedusega offline režiimis mõjutamine) 
rakendamisel on võimalik osaliselt esile kutsuda väsitavale mõjule vastu-
pidist käitumist. Eelmainitud katseülesande täitmisel kutsus ergastavate 
impulsside suunamine parempoolse ajukoore dorsolateraalsesse prefrontaal-
sesse piirkonda esile valetamise suurenemise, samas kui analoogiline vasaku 
poolkera stimulatsioon mõju ei avaldanud. (Uurimus II) 
4) Suurem teadlikkus koos suurema motiveeritusega valetada võib oluliselt 
mõjutada eksperimendi tulemust. Olukorras, kus katseisikud olid teadlikud 
sellest, et peavad valetama ja mil nad ka olid motiveeritud valetama, kaldus 
vasaku poolkera dorsolateraalse prefrontaalse koore ergastav stimuleerimine 
valetamist vähendama ning parema poolekra ergastamine valetamist 
suurendama. Samas pärssiv mõjutamine ei kutsunud esile ühtegi olulist 
poolkeradevahelist erinevust petukäitumises (Uurimus III).  
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5) rTMS’i ergastav režiim on oma mõjult süstemaatilisem võrreldes pidurdava 
režiimiga. See, kas ja kuidas erinevate poolkerade mõjutamisel erinevate 
režiimide (ergastav ja pärssiv) mõju käitumises avaldub, sõltub ülesande 
tüübist, stimulatsiooni kestusest ning stimulatsiooni tugevusest (Uurimused 
I, II ja III). Valetamise puhul rTMS’i pärssiva režiimi rakendamisel aset 
leidev teadliku kontrolli tasalülitamine võib vajada oluliselt pikemat ja 
tugevamat mõjutamist (Uurimus III) võrreldes instrueerimata ja spon-
taanselt toimuva valetamisega (Uurimus I).  
6) P300 registreerimine ja analüüs on rakendatavad petukäitumise tuvasta-
misel. Sealjuures tuleb silmas pidada, et see võimalus pole universaalne 
erinevate katseplaanide ja kõikide katseisikute puhul (Uurimus IV). P300 
väljendumismäär erineb süstemaatiliselt vastustes kriitilistele ja neutraal-
setele stiimulitele (Uurimus IV, Eksperiment 1 ja 2). Reaalsemad (elu-
lähedasemad) eksperimendid ja spetsiifilisemad stiimulid (fotod sõnade 
asemel) aitavad esile kutsuda selgemat ja suurema amplituudiga P300 
komponenti vastusena kriitilisele (olulisele) stiimulile (Uurimus IV, 
Eksperiment ja 2). 
7) Niinimetatud süülise teadmise eksperimendis avaldab rTMS mõju EEG 
sündmuspotentsiaalide kui kriitilise stiimuli äratundmise suhtes tundlike 
signatuuride väljendumisele. Dorsolateraalsesse prefrontaalsesse koorde 
suunatud pärssiva rTMS’i mõjul vähenes kriitilise stiimuli esitamisele 
vastusena saadud potentsiaalikomponendi P300 amplituud. (Uurimus IV, 
Eksperiment 1). 
8) P300 on üsna ebausaldusväärne valetamise tuvastamisel kasutatav marker, 
kui silmas pidada vastava protseduuri läbiviimist suvaliselt valitud üksik-
indiviidiga. Mõne isiku puhul on meetodi tundlikkus suur, mõne teise puhul 
aga mitte. Selle meetodi (testi) usaldusväärsus sõltub nii eksperimendi 
ülesehitusest kui ka uuringualuste isikute individuaalsetest erinevustest. 
Elukaugema ja vähema kriitilisusega stiimuleid kasutava eksperimendi-
plaani puhul oli käesoleva töö andmetel võimalik kõrgel usaldusväärsuse 
tasemel korrektselt tuvastada vaid 22% petukäitumisest (Uurimus IV, 
Eksperiment 1). Samas aga elulähedasema eksperimendiplaani puhul oli 
vastav määr 71%. (Uurimus IV, Eksperiment 2). 
Käesoleva väitekirja tulemuste põhjal võib öelda, et TMS on kasutatav tõe-
päraste tajul põhinevate hinnangute suhtelise määra mõjutajana petukäitumisel, 
ning et P300 on usaldatav marker valetamise tuvastamisel varjatava „süülise“ 
teadmise katsetes. Samuti on lavastatud varguse eksperimendis nn süülise tead-
mise testi kasutamisel võimalik P300 amplituudi väljendumismäära TMS’iga 
mõjutada. See annab kinnitust tõdemusele, et P300 on muuhulgas ka valeta-
misele tundlik EEG sündmuspotentsiaalide signatuur. Küll aga vajavad prae-
gused teadmised olulist lisa selle osas, millised võiksid olla need objektiivselt 
ajukuva abil registreeritud ajuprotsesside signatuurid, mis kehtiksid enamusel 
juhtudel ja olukordades. See võimaldaks suurema kindlusega teha oletusi ja 
anda selgitusi valetamise kontekstis ajus toimuvate protsesside kohta.  
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